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Abstract
This Article contends that the current system of weighted voting is essential for the efficient
operation of the IMF and the World Bank. Part I briefly reviews the historical background of
the IMF and the World Bank. Part II analyzes the IMF’s and the World Bank’s weighted voting
systems. Part III discusses the weighted voting systems of regional banks. Part IV discusses other
international organizations with weighted voting. Part V examines international organizations that
have equal voting systems. Part VI analyzes the changes and challenges to the weighted voting
system in the IMF and the World Bank.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, nations have joined together to create inter-
national organizations to deal with international problems and
to regulate economic ties between them.' The number and
power of these international organizations has dramatically in-
creased since World War II.2 Decision-making processes of in-
ternational organizations vary. Prior to World War II, most
international organizations had equal voting systems.'
Weighted voting, where a nation's economic or military
strength is reflected in its voting strength, was introduced after
the war.4 Today, two of the largest and most effective public
international financial organizations are the International
Monetary Fund (the "IMF") and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the "World Bank"). Both
have weighted voting systems. 5
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1. See Sweeney, From Columbus to Cooperation-Trade and Shipping Policies from 1492
to 1992, 13 FORDHAM Irr'L L.J. 481, 483-84 & 488-509 (1989-1990).
2. See generally id. (outlining rise of international cooperation after World War
II).
3. R. KLEIN, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AMONG STATES: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 1-4
& 54 (1974); see E. DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 334-
35 (1920).
4. See generally R. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 44-94
(1985) (reviewing international organizations).
5. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945,
art. XII, § 5, 60 Stat. 1401, 1418-19, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 86-88, amended
May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, amended Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T.
2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 [hereinafter IMF Articles]; Articles of Agreement of the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1944, art. V, § 3, 60
Stat. 1440, 1451, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 162 [hereinafter IBRD Articles].
These organizations' voting systems are currently undergoing challenges from Ja-
pan's recent increase in voting strength to number two in the voting order of the
IMF, by the Soviet Union's serious consideration of applying for membership to the
IMF and the World Bank, and by the demands of developing countries for a greater
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This Article contends that the current system of weighted
voting is essential for the efficient operation of the IMF and
the World Bank. Part I briefly reviews the historical back-
ground of the IMF and the World Bank. Part II analyzes the
IMF's and the World Bank's weighted voting systems. Part III
discusses the weighted voting systems of regional banks. Part
IV discusses other international organizations with weighted
voting. Part V examines international organizations that have
equal voting systems. Part VI analyzes the changes and chal-
lenges to the weighted voting system in the IMF and the World
Bank. This Article concludes that the IMF and the World Bank
should retain weighted voting to preserve efficient functioning.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK
The IMF and the World Bank were created at Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire in 1944.6 They were among the first
public international organizations established after the out-
break of World War II. During this period, nations formed in-
ternational organizations with a vision towards a new and in-
terdependent post-war world.7 The IMF and World Bank's
voting share. See infra notes 166-212 and accompanying text (discussing these devel-
opments).
6. See IMF Articles, supra note 5; IBRD Articles, supra note 5; see also E. MASON &
R. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETrON WOODS 12-13 (1973); Asherman, The
International Monetary Fund: A History of Compromise, 16 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 235,
240 (1984). See generally Silard, International Economic Institutions: The Challenge of Coor-
dination, 4 AM. U.J. Irr'L L. & POL'V 67, 69-72 (1989).
7. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 4-8; Asherman, supra note 6, at 240-41.
In 1945, one year after the IMF and the World Bank were created at the Bretton
Woods Conference, the Charter of the United Nations was adopted in San Francisco.
See U.N. CHARTER; see also R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 48. The Charter established a
close relationship between the United Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank. See id.
at 48-49. As a result, the IMF and the World Bank work closely with the United
Nations, particularly with the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD"), the U.N. Economic and Social Council, and the U.N. Education, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"). See id. at 48-52.
In 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GATr") was
signed, creating a legal framework by which nations could work to reduce tariffs and
other trade barriers. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signa-
ture Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. (5) & (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [herein-
after GATT]. Although GATT's founders envisioned the creation of a permanent
international trade organization to replace it, those plans were defeated because of
U.S. congressional opposition. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-
55 (1956). The GATT remains as a body of rules under which contracting parties
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primary economic concerns of that time were to create stability
in currency, to reconstruct the economies of war-ravaged na-
tions, and to establish a regime for international trade and in-
vestment."
A. The International Monetary Fund
The IMF was formed after five years of planning by the
United States and the United Kingdom primarily to provide
currency stability. 9 Economic events of the 1920s and 1930s
work to reduce tariffs and trade barriers. See Zamora, Voting in International Economic
Organizations, 74 AM.J. INT'L L. 566, 579 (1980). The GATT was intended to be not
an organization but a multilateral treaty, intertwined with and operating under the
International Trade Organization (the "ITO") or the Organization for Trade and
Cooperation ("OTC"). See H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956); H.R.
Doc. No. 146, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1957); H.R. Doc. No. 140, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1955). When the U.S. Congress did not approve the ITO because of protec-
tionist pressure and pressures from liberal trade interests who found the ITO's
prohibitions too weak, GAIT, which was created before the ITO, was left to survive
on its own. See Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT
"Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 277 (1991). The
general clauses of GATT were the same as those in the chapter of the draft ITO
Charter devoted to trading rules. Compare H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 and H.R. Doc. 140, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. at 5-11 with GATT, supra, arts. I-XXIII, 61
Stat. pt. 5 at 1265, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 8-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-268.
While GATT is still not technically an organization, it has been deemed and
treated as a substitute for the ITO and as an organization. See R. HUDEC, THE GATT
LEGAL SYSTEMS & WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 49 (1990); J. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING
THE GATT SYSTEM 9-17 (1990). Other public international organizations include the
European Economic Community, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries Special Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter
EEC Treaty]; Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, U.N. Doc. E/
CN. 14/AFDB, art. 35 (1964); Barnes, The African Development Bank's Role in Promoting
Regional Integration in the Economic Community of West African States, 4 B.C. THIRD WORLD
LJ. 151, 151-56 (1984) (discussing African Development Bank); Agreement Estab-
lishing the Asian Development Bank, Dec. 4, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1419, T.I.A.S. No.
6103, 571 U.N.T.S. 123; Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, EC Council Decision, No. 90/679/EEC, Nov. 19, 1990.
8. IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. I, 60 Stat. at 1401-02, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, at 1, 2
U.N.T.S. at 40; IBRD Articles, supra note 5, art. I, 60 Stat. at 1440-4 1, T.I.A.S. No.
1502, at 1-2, 2 U.N.T.S. at 134-36; see S. REP. No. 452, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10
(1945) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United Nations Sta-
bilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated
Nations (Apr. 1942) in 3 J. HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1945-
1965: TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION 37 (1969); see also
R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 5-6.
9. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing formation of IMF).
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affected its creation. The U.S. government did not want trade
problems such as those of the 1930s to reappear and cause
world-wide unemployment and depression.' 0 The IMF's basic
purpose was to promote multilateral monetary cooperation, to
stabilize and foster currency exchange among member nations,
and to revive international trade and investment."
In 1944, thirty nations founded the IMF.' 2 Membership
has since grown to 154 nations.' 3 The IMF has a board of gov-
ernors, an executive board, and a managing director.' 4 Six ex-
ecutive directors are appointed by member states with the larg-
est quotas, currently France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, with sixteen
others elected biennially to represent groups of nations.' 5 The
10. See-SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2-9; H.R. REP. No. 629, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-4 & 14-20 (1945) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; see also D. DRISCOLL, WHAT IS
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND? 3-5 (1991); R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 4-5; 1
J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 8, at 4-10; Asherman, supra note 6, at 240.
11. See IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. I, 60 Stat. at 1401-02, T.I.A.S. No. 1501,
at 2, 2 U.N.T.S. at 40; SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2-9; D. DRISCOLL, supra note
10, at 3-4.
12. See IMF Articles, supra note 5, art XX, 60 Stat. at 1429-31, T.I.A.S. No. 1501,
at 27-34, 2 U.N.T.S. at 112-20; see alsoJ. GOLD, MEMBERSHIP AND NONMEMBERSHIP IN
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 17 (1974). Fifty-five nations had been given the
opportunity to become the original members by the end of 1945. IMF Articles, supra
note 5, art. XX(1)2, schedule A, 60 Stat. at 1429-31, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, at 27-36, 2
U.N.T.S. at 112-20.
13. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS 4-
5 (Jan. 1991) (listing current members).
14. IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII, § 1, 60 Stat. at 1415, T.I.A.S. No. 1501,
at 16, 2 U.N.T.S. at 78 (stating that "Fund shall have a Board of Governors, Execu-
tive Directors, a Managing Director, and a staff").
15. Id. art. XII, § 3, 60 Stat. at 1416-18, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, at 18-19, 2 U.N.T.S.
at 82-84; see THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ANNUAL REPORT, 1990, app. VI, at
120-59 (listing executive directors and members they represent); R. EDWARDS, supra
note 4, at 28-29.
The Board of Governors, on the other hand, has one governor and an alternate
appointed by each member to cast its votes. IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII, § 2,
60 Stat. at 1415, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, at 16-17, 2 U.N.T.S. at 78; Asherman, supra note
6, at 258. Both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board apply weighted
voting. IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII §§ (2)(e) & (3)(i), 60 Stat. at 1416-18,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, at 17 & 19, 2 U.N.T.S. at 80-81 & 84-85; Asherman, supra note 6,
at 258.
All powers, except those specifically reserved to the Board of Governors, may
be, and in fact have been, delegated by the Board of Governors to the Executive
Board. See IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII, §§ 2(b), 60 Stat. at 1416, T.I.A.S. No.
1501, at 17, 2 U.N.T.S. at 80-82 (stating that "Board of Governors may delegate to
the Executive Directors authority to exercise any powers of the Board, except the
power[s]" conferred directly by Agreement on Board of Governors); INTERNATIONAL
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board of governors has always delegated its powers to the ex-
ecutive board,' 6 which consists of twenty-two executive direc-
tors and a managing director who serves as chairman and who
is selected by the executive board.' 7 The board of governors is
the senior organ of the IMF and has all the powers of the IMF
not directly conferred on the executive board or managing di-
rector, while the executive board is responsible for the general
operations of the IMF. 8 In practice the executive board is the
most important organ of the IMF, doing most of its decision-
making.' 9
B. The World Bank and Its Affiliates
The United States and the United Kingdom took a lead
role in planning both the World Bank and the IMF.2 ° Planning
for the World Bank was not as intensive as it was for the IMF. 21
While membership in the World Bank is predicated upon IMF
membership, the reverse is not true.2
The World Bank's basic purpose was to provide develop-
MONETARY FUND, BY-LAws RULES AND REGULATIONS § 15 (1988). The Articles ex-
pressly reserve to the Board of Governors the powers to: (i) admit new members and
determine the conditions of their admission; (ii) approve a revision of quotas; (iii)
approve a uniform change in the par value of the currencies of all members; (iv) make
arrangements to cooperate with other international organizations in most areas; (v)
determine the distribution of the net income of the IMF; (vi) require a member to
withdraw; (vii) decide to liquidate the IMF; (viii) decide appeals from interpretations
of the agreement by the Executive Directors; (ix) revise the provisions and rules for
repurchases and their distribution among types of monetary reserves, and (x) make
transfers from any special reserve to the IMF's general reserve. IMF Articles, supra
note 5, 60 Stat. at 1417, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, at 17, 2 U.N.T.S. at 80-82, amended May
31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, 2779, T.I.A.S. No, 6748, at 5-6; seeJ. GOLD, VOTING AND
DECISIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 10-14 (1972) (discussing Board's
powers).
16. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 28.
17. Id. at 28-29.
18. Id. at 25-28 (discussing structure of Board of Governors).
19. Id. at 28-30.
20. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-8.
21. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-8; E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6,
at 12-13; see also T. FERGUSON, THE THIRD WORLD AND DECISIONMAKING IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND 26 (1988); Mikesell, The Emergence of the World Bank as a
Development Institution, in BRETrON WOODS REVISITED 70-72 (A. Acheson, J. Chant &
M. Prachowny eds. 1972).
22. IBRD Articles, supra note 5, art. II, § 1(a), 60 Stat. at 1441, T.I.A.S. No.
1502, at 2, 2 U.N.T.S. at 136. IMF members need not be World Bank members. See
id. art II, § 1(b), 60 Stat. at 1441, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, at 2, 2 U.N.T.S. at 136.
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ment loans to its member nations." These loans were
targeted to assist in the reconstruction and restoration of their
economies, and to promote investment and growth. 24  Euro-
pean countries were the initial recipients of World Bank assist-
ance. 2 5 As the economies of the war-torn countries were re-
stored, however, the World Bank turned its attention toward
third world development.
Initially, the World Bank had thirty members.2 6 Its mem-
bership has since grown to 154 member states.2 The World
Bank's structure is similar to the IMF's. The World Bank has
twenty-one executive directors.2 Its president also serves as
chairman. 9
Four affiliates have joined the World Bank since its estab-
lishment-the International Finance Corporation (the "IFC"),
established in 1956;s0 the International Development Agency
(the "IDA"), established in 1960;31 the International Centre
23. Id. art. I, 60 Stat. at 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, at 1-2, 2 U.N.T.S. at 134-36.
24. See id.
25. See E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 52-54 (discussing history of World
Bank).
26. Asherman, supra note 6, at 240.
27. See Farnsworth, Bush's Move Unlikely to Mean Quick Trade Surge, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 1990, at A22, col. 1.
28. IBRD Articles, supra note 5, art. V, § 4, 60 Stat. at 1451, T.I.A.S. No. 1502,
at 13-14, 2 U.N.T.S. at 162; see Kammert, The World Bank Group, in INTERNATIONAL
BANKING HANDBOOK 462, 467 (W. Baughn & D. Mandich eds. 1983).
29. IBRD Articles, supra note 5, art V, § 5, 60 Stat. at 1452, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, at
14-15, 2 U.N.T.S. at 164-66.
30. International Finance Corporation Articles of Agreement, May 25, 1955, 7
U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 118; E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note
6, at 77-82 (discussing structure of IFC).
31. International Development Association Articles of Agreement, Sept. 24,
1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 439 U.N.T.S. 249.
The IFC and the IDA were established to assist in lending to developing coun-
tries, primarily because the World Bank could not lend to the poorest countries with-
out hurting its own credit position in international credit markets. See E. MASON & R.
ASHER, supra note 6, at 80; Silkenat, The Role of International Development Institutions in
International Project Financing: IBRD, IFC and Co-Financing Techniques, 17 Irr'L LAw.
615, 620-24 (1983). With the creation of the IFC and the IDA, the World Bank came
to be known as the World Bank Group. The IFC was established to facilitate eco-
nomic development by investing in productive private enterprises in less developed
countries in association with private investors without governmental guarantees of
the investments. E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 80. The IFC has since given
much of its power back to the World Bank. See id.
The IDA was established to provide concessional loans to less developed coun-
tries to finance bank-type projects. See id. at 80-81; see also D. DRISCOLL, THE IMF AND
THE WORLD BANK: How Do THEY DIFFER? 5 (1988). The IDA works more closely
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for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the "ICSID"), estab-
lished in 1966;12 and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (the "MIGA"), established in 1988. s3 The World Bank
operates in a manner virtually identical to the IMF, but is more
management-dominated than the IMF because it is predomi-
nantly a project lending institution. 4
C. The Formation and Functioning of the IMF, the World Bank,
and Other Public International Organizations
When the IMF and the World Bank were formed, the
United States had the world's strongest economy. Accord-
ingly, the United States assumed a leadership role in the IMF
and the World Bank Group, supplying approximately one-
third of the finances of both.35 In part as a result of U.S. eco-
nomic strength at that time, Washington, D.C. became the site
of the IMF's and the World Bank's headquarters.3 6  The na-
tions founding these institutions decided that all executive di-
rectors would not be international servants, but would be ac-
with the World Bank than does the IFC, and has its membership divided into two
categories: high-income countries and middle and low-income countries. See E. MA-
SON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 81. "Part I countries are the high-income member
countries, which through governmental appropriations provide virtually all of the us-
able resources of the [IDA]." Id. Part II countries are composed of the remaining
middle and low-income members. See id. It has a more active role in the functioning
of the World Bank Group than the IFC. Both of these organizations function in a
manner similar to the World Bank.
32. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID]; see E. MAsoN & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 82 &
339-41.
ICSID was established to help deal with investment disputes between states and
foreign investors. ICSID, supra, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
159; see Delaum, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INrr'L L. 784 (1983).
33. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,
opened for signature Oct. 11, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter MIGA Con-
vention]. MIGA provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration but does not en-
gage in them. See SHIHATA, MIGA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 109 (1988).
MIGA was formed to issue guarantees against non-commercial risks in respect of
investments, and encourage the flow of investments for productive purposes among
the member countries. See MIGA Convention, supra, art. 2, 24 I.L.M. at 1608.
34. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 85-97.
35. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 13-15; HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at
8-9 & 25-27; see also J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 227-38 (providing fuller listing of
percentages).
36. See E. MASoN & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 31.
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countable to the countries they represent.3 7
Most authorities support the conclusion that the IMF, the
World Bank, and the regional development banks have been
extremely effective in fulfilling their intended purposes.3 8 The
IMF, for instance, has, since its creation, overseen and main-
tained the international monetary system, lent billions of dol-
lars to developing member nations in need, and provided in-
valuable technical assistance and training to developing na-
tions in certain specialized areas.3 9 The IMF has provided
technical assistance in organizing central banks, establishing
and reforming tax systems, and setting up agencies to gather
and publish economic statistics.4 ° During 1983 and 1984, for
example, the IMF lent approximately US$22 billion to member
countries that were having trouble paying their financial obli-
gations to other member nations.4 1 The IMF also assists mem-
ber nations whose economies were disrupted by Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait.42 In addition, the IMF is assisting the countries
of Eastern Europe in their transition to market economies, as
well as continuing to help developing nations achieve stable
economic growth.43
The World Bank, similarly, has been, and continues to be,
an effective institution. The World Bank has lent billions of
dollars to developing nations for various projects.4 4 In 1989,
for instance, the World Bank lent US$20.7 billion to member
nations for development programs.4 5
The progress and effectiveness of the IMF, the World
Bank, and their related institutions, all of which have weighted
37. See E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 30-31; see also I J. HORSEFIELD,
supra note 8, at 133.
38. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 11-23 & 44-48; Silard, supra note 6, at 69.
39. D. DRISCOLL, supra note 10, at 13, 19-21; D. DRISCOLL, supra note 31, at 10-
13.
40. D. DRISCOLL, supra note 31, at 12.
41. D. DRISCOLL, supra note 10, at 13 & 21.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id.; see IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 6-60 (1990).
44. See THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 1990, 39-86, 183-220 (listing monies
lent to developing nations) [hereinafter IBRD ANNUAL REPORT]; see also D. DRISCOLL,
supra note 31, at 10-13. While two-thirds of the assistance provided by the World
Bank went to electric power and transportation projects during the first two decades
of the World Bank's existence, the World Bank has since become more diversified in
the types of projects in which it assists. Id. at 6 & 13.
45. IBRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 12.
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voting systems, is not evident in any other public international
organization. The United Nations, while being as important if
not more important an organization than the IMF and the
World Bank, has not been nearly as effective as the IMF or the
World Bank. As UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar
stated:
The will to use the machinery of the Charter needs to be
consciously strengthened. This year, time after time we
have seen the Organization set aside or rebuffed, for this
reason or for that, in situations in which it should, and
could, have played an important and constructive role.4 6
In UNCTAD, for instance, many recommendations and
programs adopted by consensus on trade, finance, developing
nations, and other areas have not been fulfilled.47 These in-
clude open-ended compensatory or supplementary financing
schemes, encroachment or change of existing international in-
stitutions such as the IMF, a binding code for the transfer of
technology, the implementation of any kind of mandatory
targets, and international development strategies.48 The
weighted voting system used by the IMF and the World Bank
gives these organizations greater effectiveness in implement-
ing decisions.
II. THE IMF'S AND THE WORLD BANK'S WEIGHTED
VOTING SYSTEMS
A. The IMF's Weighted Voting System
1. Background
When the IMF and the World Bank began, the United
States had approximately thirty-three percent and thirty-five
percent of the vote, respectively, while the United Kingdom
had approximately sixteen percent and fifteen percent of the
46. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION 4,
37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/37/1 (1982).
47. See S. MICHALAK, JR., UNCTAD: AN ORGANIZATION BETRAYING ITS MISSION
74 (1983); Krishnamurti; UNCTAD as a Negotiating Institution, 15J. WORLD TRADE L. 3,
7 (1984).
48. See S. MICHALAK, supra note 47, at 74; Krishnamurti, supra note 47, at 8-14.
This is not to say, however, that UNCTAD does not provide a very valuable function
of strengthening and uniting the developing nations for negotiating purposes. See id.
UNCTAD has been effective and has done much useful work in areas such as interna-
tional monetary reform and restrictive business practices. See id.
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vote, respectively.4 9 While many have criticized the United
States for having an excessive proportion of the voting
power, 50 this proportion resulted from the dominant economic
position that the United States held immediately after World
War II. U.S. voting power has since steadily declined to the
current levels of 19.1 percent in the IMF and 17.22 percent in
the World Bank. 5' Moreover, it was the United States that in-
sisted on basic votes for members from the beginning, propos-
ing one hundred basic votes with an additional one vote for the
equivalent of each US$1 million of quota. 52 The United King-
dom, on the other hand, had little interest in the voting
formula. Lord John Maynard Keynes, special consultant to the
British Treasury, stated:
It is depressing that so much attention has been concen-
trated on voting. It never crossed my mind that we were
under an accusation of having tried to rig this. Indeed, so
little attention was paid to it that we had not even examined
how it would work out in practice. Some of the American
press comments dealing with this as a branch of power poli-
tics is, in its way, an extraordinary exhibition of vulgarity."
The agreement as to basic votes was more easily reached
in the IMF than in the World Bank. The issue of basic votes
for the World Bank was actually not resolved until a few days
before the end of the Bretton Woods Conference, after some
delegations claimed that voting power should be determined
exclusively by shareholding as it was in other banks and com-
mercial enterprises.54 Delegates to the Convention eventually
49. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 238; E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 802
(listing percentages of voting strength).
50. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 43-49; see also T. FERGUSON, supra note 21, at
63. This criticism comes primarily from the developing nations, which argue that,
being a majority among world nations, they should have a greater role in the deci-
sion-making process of the Fund. See J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 43-49; see also T.
FERGUSON, supra note 21, at 7.
51. See IBRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, app. E (Statement of Voting Power
and Subscriptions and Contributions); 1990 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ANNUAL.
REPORT app. VI (Executive Directors and Voting Power on April 30, 1990) [hereinaf-
ter IMF ANNUAL REPORT].
52. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 22-23; see also Gold, The Origins of Weighted Voting
Power in the Fund, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1981, at 27.
53. See Gold, supra note 52, at 27 (quoting letter written on April 16, 1943 to
British Treasury official in Washington, D.C.).
54. Id. at 26-27.
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agreed to adopt the same voting system as the IMF in defer-
ence to the traditional doctrine of equality of states, and be-
cause the World Bank was a regulatory as well as financial or-
ganization. 55
Furthermore, there was a dispute between the United
States and the United Kingdom as to what majorities should be
required for decisions. Harry Dexter White, assistant to the
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, proposed special majorities of
the total voting power for a variety of decisions so that the
United States would be able to block decisions with which it
did not agree. 56 Lord Keynes, however, vigorously opposed
this approach; seeking to minimize constraints on the United
Kingdom's freedom of action, he preferred that simple majori-
ties prevail. 7 It was eventually agreed to have special majori-
ties within certain areas, although the number of special major-
ities has since increased. 8
Despite the disagreement and compromise as to voting
power, Lord Keynes nonetheless believed that voting power
would prove to be unimportant:
I most strongly agree with you that in actual working voting
power is not likely to prove important. If the organisation
begins voting about everything, it will not be long before it
breaks down.
59
55. Id.
56. Id. at 28. The United States proposed special majorities of eighty percent
for many decisions of substance, and also proposed, probably to meet the objections
to special majorities, that no member have more than twenty-five percent of the vot-
ing power. Id.
57. Id. Lord Keynes argued that it is better to seek to minimize constraints on
freedom of action and that the United States only wanted such a high majority so it
could block decisions it did not like. Id.
58. See generally IMF Articles, supra note 5, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937; J.
GOLD, VOTING MAJORITIES IN THE FUND: EFFECTS OF SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE
ARTICLES, IMF Pamphlet Series No. 20 (1977). In 1977, by endorsing the incorpora-
tion of the Second Amendment of the IMF Articles into the IMF Articles of Agree-
ment, the United States agreed to a decrease in its quota to under twenty percent in
order to increase the quotas of oil-exporting countries, but only after delegations
agreed to expand the use of the eighty-five percent special majority to all "political"
decisions, totalling approximately thirty types of decisions. See id. at 39-40 & 57-61.
59. Gold, supra note 52, at 27 (containing letter Mr. Keynes wrote to Jacob Viner
dated June 9, 1943).
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2. Quotas and the Weighted Voting System
The IMF and the World Bank differ from most public in-
ternational organizations because they follow a weighted vot-
ing system.6° Voting is based on quotas related to economic
criteria.6 1 Quotas are based upon a complex formula that con-
siders such relative economic strength factors as gross domes-
tic product, external reserves, and variability of exports.62 At
the outset, the United States and the United Kingdom ac-
cepted the principle of weighted voting for the IMF and the
World Bank, and did not object during the Bretton Woods
Conference.63 Members expressed concern about the doctrine
of equality of states, a doctrine strongly embedded in the his-
tory of international organizations. 64 As a result, at pre-con-
ference negotiations, members discussed various numbers for
basic votes to allot to each country. 5 The final agreement
reached for the IMF and the World Bank gave each nation 250
basic votes, with a weighted voting of one additional vote for
60. See infta notes 153-65 and accompanying text (discussing organizations that
lack weighted voting systems).
61. IMF Articles, supra note 5, arts. III & XII § 5, 60 Stat. at 1402-03 & 1415-19,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, at 2-3 & 20, 2 U.N.T.S. at 42-46 & 86-89; see IMF Press Release
No. 90/25 (June 1, 1990); see alsoJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 22-23; F. LISTER, DECI-
SION-MAKING STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE IMF MODEL 46-
48 (1984).
62. Hosomi,Japan Takes Over the IMF, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1988, at 103. See gener-
ally J. GOLD, supra note 35, at 6 & 17-30; F. LISTER, supra note 47, at 45-46. The
quotas of the nations participating at the Bretton Woods Conference were deter-
mined "ad hoc, according to a nation's political power at the time." Asherman, supra
note 6, at 255; see 1 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 8, at 97.99.
In contrast to the quotas of the thirty original nations, initial quotas of nations
that later joined were determined by the Board of Governors. IMF Articles, supra
note 5, art. III, § 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2206, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 4; see Asherman, supra
note 6, at 255. The IMF Articles give the Board of Governors no guidelines to deter-
mine quotas. See IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. III, § 2, 29 U.S.T. at 2206, T.I.A.S.
No. 8937, at 4; Asherman, supra note 6, at 255. The Board of Governors also con-
ducts a general review of each nation's quotas at intervals of not more than five years
and proposes any adjustments of the quotas of the members which it deems appro-
priate. See IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. III, §§ 1-2, 29 U.S.T. at 2206, T.I.A.S. No.
8937, at 4; see also F. LISTER, supra note 45, at 51; Asherman, supra note 7, at 255.
63. See Gold, supra note 52, at 26. See generally F. LISTER, supra note 61, at 44-51;
Asherman, supra note 6, at 254-55.
64. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 54-55;J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 18-19;
Gold, supra note 52, at 26-27; see also F. LISTER, supra note 61, at 46-48.
65. See IJ. HORSEFIELD, supra note 8, at 34 & 81; see alsoJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at
22-23; Asherman, supra note 6, at 255-57.
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each part of a nation's quota equivalent to US$100,000. 66 The
basic votes were included because of the concern that some of
the less developed members with very small quotas would
otherwise have no sense of participation in the organizations'
functions.67 This concern was more evident in the IMF than in
the World Bank because the World Bank would lend money to
the member nations regardless of their quotas.68
The IMF's weighted voting system is quite complex. Ad-
justments are made in certain instances relating to a member
nation's net purchases of the currencies of other members and
net purchases made by other members of its currency. 69 For
purposes of voting under IMF article V, sections four (waiver
of conditions) and five (ineligibility to use the IMF's general
resources), 70 a member's voting power decreases when it has a
net purchase of currencies of other members, and increases
when other members have a net purchase of its currency.7 '
The United States proposed the provision basing votes on
currency holding so that a member's voting power would re-
flect the member's financial position in the IMF.72 The United
States was interested in giving members that provide "credit"
to the IMF (i.e., the United States in 1944) a larger voice in the
conduct of the IMF and to give a smaller voice to members
66. J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 18. This formula has since been changed, so that
each nation now receives 250 basic votes plus one additional vote for each part of a
nation's quota equivalent to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights. See R. EDWARDS, supra
note 4, at 32.
67. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 18-19; Gold, supra note 52, at 26-27.
68. See E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 30.
69. See generally J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 30-43.
70. IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. V, §§ 4-5, 61 Stat. at 1406-07, T.I.A.S. No.
1501, at 7, 2 U.N.T.S. at 54-56.
71. Id. Article XII, section 5(b) of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides for
the adjustment of a member's number of votes:
(i) by the addition of one vote for the equivalent of each four hundred thou-
sand special drawing rights of net sales of its currency from the general re-
sources of the [IMF] up to the date when the vote is taken, or
(ii) by the subtraction of one vote for the equivalent of each four hundred
thousand special drawing rights of its net purchases under Article V, Section
3(b) and (f) up to the date when the vote is taken, provided that neither net
purchases nor net sales shall be deemed at any time to exceed an amount
equal to the quota of the member involved.
Id. art. XII, § 5(b), 29 U.S.T. at 2233, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 31.
72. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 13-15; HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at
26; J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 31-32; Asherman, supra note 6, at 254-55.
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enjoying the benefit of that "credit. '7 3 A member's voting
power is adjusted upwards by the addition of one vote for each
400,000 Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs") purchased from the
IMF in the equivalent of other members' currency. 4
At the Bretton Woods Conference, the United States ini-
tially proposed an increase or reduction of quotas for every
US$200,000 providing credit to the IMF of net purchases or
sales of a currency.75 However, there was much opposition to
the U.S. proposal to adjust weighted voting power according
to a member's use of or contribution to the IMF's resources.7 6
Many argued that a member should not be penalized for using
the IMF's resources, and that the proposed formula would re-
sult in too large a reduction in a member's voting power if that
member purchased too much currency. 77 As a result, a com-
promise was reached whereby adjustments were made for
every US$400,000 paid in or borrowed and a maximum limit
was placed on adjustments through the provision that net sales
or net purchases of currency were deemed not to exceed a
member's quota. 78  A member's voting power thus could not
be adjusted more than twenty-five percent downward in any
73. See J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 31.
74. IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII, § 5(b), 29 U.S.T. at 2233, T.I.A.S. No.
8937, at 31; see Asherman, supra note 6, at 256; supra note 71 (quoting section 5(b)).
75. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 31.
76. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 13-15; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at
26;J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 31-32.
77. See J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 31-32.
78. Id. at 32-33; see supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining purchases
and sales of currency). IMF article V, section (3)(b) provides that
[a] member shall be entitled to purchase the currencies of other members
from the [IMF] in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own currency
subject to the following conditions:
(i) the member's use of the general resources of the Fund would be in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the policies adopted
under them;
(ii) the member represents that it has a need to make the purchase be-
cause of its balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in
its reserves;
(iii) the proposed purchase would be a reserve tranche purchase, or
would not cause the Fund's holdings of the purchasing member's currency
to exceed two hundred percent of its quota;
(iv) the Fund has not previously declared under Section 5 of this Arti-
cle, Article VI, Section 1, or Article XXVI, Section 2(a) that the member
desiring to purchase is ineligible to use the general resources of the [IMF].
IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. V, § 3(b), 29 U.S.T. 2211, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 9.
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twelve-month period as a result of net purchases. 9
3. Importance of Voting Within the IMF
Although such complex and elaborate voting procedures
exist, rarely is a vote held within the IMF, and when it is held
the vote is usually unanimous or nearly so. 80 This is the case
because the members are always making an effort to compro-
mise on an agreement all can accept. In fact, Rule C-10 of The
Rules and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund notes that
the executive board chairman "shall ordinarily ascertain the
sense of the meeting in lieu of a formal vote.""'
Voting strength is nonetheless important in many aspects
of the IMF's functions. One aspect where voting majorities are
important is in the biennial elections of executive directors,
where a candidate needs a minimum proportion of the votes
allotted to members to be elected.8 2 Members with homoge-
nous interests and with modest voting strength can in that case
unify their voting power to elect a candidate of their choice. 3
Another area where voting strength is important is where
79. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 13-14.
The complexity of the formula for adjusting voting power is also seen in the
definition of "net sales" and "net purchases" for purposes of adjustment. See J.
GOLD, supra note 15, at 37-38. The level of the IMF's holdings of a member's cur-
rency does not necessarily determine the member's voting power, as only certain
transactions with the IMF are taken into account. See id. at 38-43 (discussing World
Bank's currency holding formula). The executive directors have not found a need to
define the formula because voting in the practice of the IMF is very infrequent, and
because it is extremely unlikely that the slight variation resulting from the formula
adjustment would ever make a difference in a vote. Id. at 38-39. Until mid-1971, the
IMF had only one formal vote that required adjusted weighted voting power calcula-
tions. See id. at 196. This one vote was one of thirty votes overall, twenty-five of
which occurred between 1946 and 1953. Id.
80. See IBRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44; IMF ANNUAL REPORT, Supra note 51
(providing breakdown of votes); see also J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 195-97.
81. IMF RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 15, R. C-10.
82. IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII, § 3 & schedule E; 29 U.S.T. at 2231 &
2266-67, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 26-30 & 64-65.
83. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing election of directors).
In 1990, the Executive Board consisted of five executive directors, one each from
France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
appointed pursuant to article XII, section 3(c). IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51,
app. VI; see IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII, § 3(c), 29 U.S.T. at 2231, T.I.A.S. No.
8937, at 29. Saudi Arabia, being one of the two non-appointed members whose cur-
rencies have been drawn from the General Resource Account in the largest absolute
amounts, is entitled to an appointment. Id. The IMF elects sixteen executive direc-
tors (one of whom represents only China) pursuant to a 1980 understanding in which
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special majorities are required to make a decision. 84 In such
instances, a member or a group of members with enough votes
can block the adoption of certain decisions.85 Members that
have or can collectively muster more than fifteen percent of the
total voting power may, for example, block the adoption of de-
cisions to adjust quotas, establish a council, allocate SDRs,86
provide for general exchange arrangements, or institute a par
value.87
Moreover, a special majority of seventy percent is required
to resolve certain operational issues, such as the rates of the
charges on the use of the IMF's resources, and the interest rate
on SDR holdings. 8 The Second Amendment of the IMF Arti-
cles greatly increased the number of decisions for which spe-
cial majorities are required.8 9 Furthermore, even where simple
majorities are required, voting strength remains important be-
cause the executive directors normally desire broad-based sup-
port for decisions. 90 Thus, while votes are held rarely, voting
strength remains important in building a consensus before
making decisions. 9 1
Moreover, when a vote occurs, IMF members seek to
avoid a confrontation where possible. An example of this is an
the number of elected directors was increased from fifteen to sixteen. See R. ED-
WARDS, supra note 4, at 29 n.123.
84. See generally J. GOLD, supra note 58.
85. See id.
86. R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 32-33; see IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. III
§ 2(c), 29 U.S.T. at 2206, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 4 (concerning adjustment of quotas);
id. art. XII § 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2229, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 27 (concerning establishment
of Council); id. art. XV, § 2, 29 U.S.T. at 2238, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 36 (concerning
SDRs); id. art. XVII, 29 U.S.T. at 2239-40, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 37-38 (concerning
participants and other holders of SDRs). See generally Research and Treasurer's Reports,
in ROLE OF SDR IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1987); J. GOLD, SPECIAL
DRAWING RIGHTs, IMF Pamphlet Series No. 13 (1969); Asherman, supra note 6, at
274-76.
87. R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 32-33; see IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. IV,
§ 2(c), 29 U.S.T. at 2209, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 7 (discussing general exchange agree-
ments); id. art. IV § 4, 29 U.S.T. at 2209-10, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 7-8 (discussing
institution of par value systems).
88. STAFF OF IMF, THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND (1985).
89. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 58, at 6 (discussing Second Amendment of Articles).
90. Id. at 9; see IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII, § 5(c), 29 U.S.T. at 2233,
T.I.A.S. No. 8937, at 31. Simple majorities are required whenever the IMF Articles
do not require a special majority. Id.
91. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 198-99.
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IMF vote on a US$1.1 billion loan to South Africa in 1983.92
The executive board representatives of the African nations
were opposed to the loan.93 Rather than confront the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia, who had al-
ready stated their support for the loan, they abstained from
voting, as did eight Latin American countries, thereby allowing
the loan to pass without much of a fight.94
4. National Groupings in the IMF Voting System
The groupings of nations are also an interesting aspect of
the manner of voting.9 5 The negotiations by which the mem-
bers combine for the election of an executive director are done
outside of the IMF's structure and are often quite complex. 96
The durability of the resulting groupings varies, with some
permanent over time, some semi-permanent, and others occa-
sional.97 With the exception of the grouping of the American
republics that are not entitled to individually appoint executive
directors, no provisions exist that there be regional or other
types of groupings.9 There are no regional or other types of
restrictions for the groupings of members for the purposes of
92. See Kwitny, Going Along: How IMF Overcame Political Issues to Vote a Loan to
South Africa, Wall St. J., May 5, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. The groupings are divergent, with members from different continents and
with different economic systems or cultures combining in a group. One group, for
example, consists of Cyprus, Israel, the Netherlands, Romania, and Yugoslavia, with
the Netherlands having more than half of the voting strength within the group and
with the executive director and alternate executive director being from the Nether-
lands. IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at app. VI, at 20. Other groups with
divergent members include a group in which Spain is the only non-American country
aligned with Mexico, Venezuela, and most of the Central American countries, and a
group in which Canada and Ireland are grouped with ten Caribbean countries. See id.
There are also groups with members coming from the same general region. One
group, for instance, consists of Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Maldives, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United
Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic, and the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen. See id. at 120-21. There are also three groups with all Asian and Australian
members. See id. at 14-22. The number of members in each group varies from one,
China, to twenty-four, with the two largest groups consisting of African developing
countries. Id. at 120-23. The American republics may have a separate election for
executive directors, who will receive at least twenty-eight percent of the eligible
votes. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 71; 1J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 8, at 106.
96. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 63-66.
97. See id. at 65.
98. See id. at 64.
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electing executive directors. 99 Delegations at Bretton Woods
proposed special groupings similar to those of the American
republics, but they were not accepted.' 00
An executive director may cast his vote only as a unit, but
if a conflict arises within the group he is free to abstain from
voting. ° t In the alternative, the executive director may vote
with the group, but place the divergent views of the members
on the record in the minutes. 10 2 Delegates at the Bretton
Woods Conference and at the drafting of the amendment of
the Articles of Agreement proposed that a member be able to
split his votes, but the proposal was rejected mainly because it
would have diluted the effectiveness of a member's participa-
tion if the member had more than one executive director.10 3
The IMF's voting system rarely requires votes because of
the realistic reflection in the voting system of the members'
relative strength and power. Additionally, the executive direc-
tors, keeping in mind that the less powerful members must not
be ignored, try to reach a consensus in making decisions.' 0 4
B. The World Bank Group Weighted Voting System
1. The World Bank Voting System
The World Bank has a weighted voting system similar to
the IMF.' 0 5 Like the IMF, each member has 250 basic votes
plus one additional vote for each share of capital equivalent to
US$100,000 subscribed.'0 6 The World Bank based each mem-
ber's quota on IMF quotas.' 0 7 While most states wanted a
large quota in the IMF, giving them enhanced drawing rights,
the less developed countries preferred a lower quota in the
World Bank because the amount they could borrow was in-
dependent of their capital contribution. 0  To resolve the con-
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 66.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 198-99.
105. Compare IBRD Articles, supra note 5, art. V, § 3, 60 Stat. at 1451, T.I.A.S.
No. 1502, at 13, 2 U.N.T.S. at 162 with IMF Articles, supra note 5, art. XII, § 5, 60
Stat. at 1418-19, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, at 20, 2 U.N.T.S. at 86-88.
106. See E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 392.
107. See id. at 30.
108. See id
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troversy, the United States agreed to accept a larger quota in
the World Bank than in the IMF.' °9
2. The IDA and the MIGA Voting Systems
While the World Bank has a voting formula similar to that
of the IMF, its affiliate, the IDA, does not."10 In the IDA, each
original member had 500 basic votes plus one additional vote
for each US$5000 (1960 dollars) of subscription."' The
formula has since been changed six times; each member cur-
rently has 9,900 basic votes plus one vote for each US$25 of
subscription." 2 Furthermore, developing countries are per-
mitted to make additional subscriptions payable in their own
currencies to avoid a reduction in their voting power.' The
industrial countries do not receive additional votes for each
US$25 of subscription until after they have made a contribu-
tion of US$10,279.60." 4 The voting formula in the IDA is
thus much more favorable toward developing countries than
the formula in the IMF and the World Bank.
MIGA also has a more favorable voting formula for devel-
oping countries. 15 MIGA has adopted a voting formula simi-
lar to the World Bank's with the additional provision that dur-
ing the first three years of MIGA's existence, supplemental
votes would be issued to the developing countries to ensure
that they attain a minimum of forty percent of the total
votes." 6 At the end of those three years, however, the Council
of MIGA would review the allocation of shares and structure
the votes to reflect the actual subscriptions, attain voting par-
ity, and facilitate members' ability to subscribe to their
shares. " 17
109. See id.
110. Compare IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 31, art. VI, § 3, 11 U.S.T. at
2290-97, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, at 13-14, 439 U.N.T.S. at 270 with IBRD Articles, supra
note 5, art. V, § 3, 60 Stat. at 1451, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, at 13, 2 U.N.T.S. at 162.
111. E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at 392; see WORLD BANK STAFF, IDA IN
RETROSPECT 6-7 (1982) [hereinafter IDA IN RETROSPECT].
112. See IDA IN RETROSPECT 6-7.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See MIGA Convention, supra note 33, arts. 39-42, 24 I.L.M. at 1620-21.
116. See id. art 39(b), 24 I.L.M. at 1620; SHIHATA, supra note 33, at 318-19.
117. See MIGA Convention, supra note 33, art. 39(c), 24 I.L.M. at 1620.
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III. THE REGIONAL BANKS' WEIGHTED VOTING
SYSTEMS
While the four regional development banks are modeled
after the World Bank in terms of voting and structure, there
are some significant differences. Each regional bank allows
non-regional members to join, but ensures that the regional
members hold a majority of the voting power. Moreover, the
basic votes as a percentage of the total votes vary among the
three regional banks.
In the Inter-American Bank (the "IDB"), there are cur-
rently forty-four members, each having 135 basic votes.'
While the IDB originally allowed only regional countries to be
members, it allowed other non-regional countries to join in
1976 and 1977, although the regional countries still main-
tained the majority of the voting power." 9 The basic votes in
the IDB are equivalent to only 3.2 percent of the total votes, as
opposed to eleven percent in the World Bank.' 20
In the African Development Bank (the "AfDB"), there
were seventy-three members as of 1988.121 Until 1982, only
regional countries were members.1 22 Thereafter, non-regional
members were allowed to acquire more funds, while the re-
gional members still controlled the majority of the voting
power.123 The AfDB allocates forty-five percent of the total
votes as basic votes, giving 625 to each member.12 4
The African Development Fund was created in 1973 to as-
sist the AfDB with additional funds from developed nations.
In the African Development Fund, the developed nations and
regional members each have fifty percent of the voting
power. 25
The Asian Development Bank (the "ADB"), unlike the
other two regional banks, was established with regional and
118. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ANNUAL REPORT (1988); see Zamora,
supra note 7, at 578 & 594.
119. Epstein, Inter-American Development Bank, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING HAND-
BOOK, 503, 507-08 (W. Baughn & D. Mandich eds. 1983).
120. See Zamora, supra note 7, at 594.
121. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANNUAL REPORT 92-93 (1988).
122. See id.
123. See Zamora, supra note 7, at 577 n.41.
124. See id. at 578.
125. See id.
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non-regional members. As of 1989, there were forty-seven
members, with basic votes equivalent to twenty percent of total
votes distributed.' 26 Another unique aspect of the ADB is that
the basic votes are a constant twenty percent of the total votes,
thereby preventing the decline of less developed countries'
voting strength as total votes increase with an increase in quo-
tas. 1
2 7
A fourth regional bank, established on May 29, 1990, is
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.1 2 1
In this organization, there are forty members.' 29 The member
nations from the European Community control fifty-one per-
cent of the World Bank's capital; the United States, the bank's
largest single member, controls ten percent, Japan 8.5 percent,
and the Soviet Union six percent. i3  The voting strength of
each nation is based exclusively on each nation's capital
strength.' 3'
IV. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH
WEIGHTED VOTING
Another organization that has a type of weighted voting
system is the European Economic Community (the "EEC"). In
the EEC's principal organ, the Council of Ministers, each
member has a fixed number of votes.' 3 2 France, Germany, It-
aly, and the United Kingdom have the most votes, ten each,
while Luxembourg has the fewest, two.' 33 Unlike the IMF and
126. Id. at 594; see ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ANNUAL REPORT (1989).
127. See Zamora, supra note 7, at 594.
128. See N. GIANARIS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES: Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS 164 (1991); see also Farnsworth, U.S. Role in Aid Bank Draws Fire,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1990, at D1, col. 1; Riding, Industrial Nations to Create Bank to Aid
Eastern Europe, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at D2, col. 1; Greenhouse, Nations Widen
Role for East-Bloc Aid, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1990, at A12, col. 1.
129. See N. GIANARIS, supra note 128, at 164; see also Farnsworth, U.S. Role in Aid
Bank Draws Fire, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1990, at DI, col. 1; Riding, Industrial Nations to
Create Bank to Aid Eastern Europe, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at D2, col. 1; Green-
house, Nations Widen Role for East-Bloc Aid, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1990, at A12, col. 1.
130. See N. GIANARIS, supra note 128, at 164; see also Farnsworth, U.S. Role in Aid
Bank Draws Fire, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1990, at DI, col. 1; Riding, Industrial Nations to
Create Bank to Aid Eastern Europe, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at D2, col. 1; Green-
house, Nations Widen Role for East-Bloc Aid, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1990, at A 12, col. 1.
131. See Farnsworth, U.S. Role in Aid Bank Draws Fire, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1990,
at DI, col. 1.
132. EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 148; see Zamora, supra note 7, at 583.
133. EEC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 148; see Zamora, supra note 7, at 583.
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the World Bank, the EEC does not set forth guidelines by
which to determine a member nation's voting strength, but
rather determines voting power based upon a combination of
considerations such as economic strength, historical prece-
dent, political reality, and population.13 4
The OPEC Special Fund also has a weighted voting system
that is different from that of the IMF and the World Bank.' 35
While each of the thirteen members on the Governing Com-
mittee has one vote, committee decisions require a two-thirds
majority, provided that members in the majority contribute at
least seventy percent of the fund. 3 6 Moreover, certain matters
require a higher majority and a higher percentage of contribu-
tions. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the largest contributors to the
fund, each contributing approximately twenty-five percent. 137
It can thus be seen that even developing countries support a
weighted voting system where they have contributed higher
proportions than other members.
Another economic organization with weighted voting is
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (the
"IFAD"), which was established to provide concessional lend-
ing to developing countries for agricultural projects. 38 The
IFAD's weighted voting system is different from others previ-
ously mentioned. The IFAD divides the total of 1800 votes
equally into three categories: developed countries, OPEC
countries, and developing countries. 39 Each category is al-
lowed to determine how to distribute its 600 votes; the devel-
oped and OPEC countries have selected a weighted voting sys-
tem while the developing countries have selected an equal vot-
134. See Zamora, supra note 7, at 582-83.
135. Agreement Establishing the OPEC Special Fund, Jan. 28, 1976, art. 5, 15
I.L.M. 1356, 1359-61 [hereinafter OPEC Agreement]. While OPEC was established
in September 1960 as a result of a conference held in Baghdad, Iraq, the thirteen
member countries-Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela-also estab-
lished a new financial facility, the OPEC Special Fund, in January 1976, whose pur-
pose is to recycle petrodollars to non-oil producing developing nations. See id.; see
also A. DANIELSEN, THE EVOLUrION OF OPEC 4-5 (1982); Zamora, supra note 7, at 588.
136. OPEC Agreement, supra note 135; see Zamora, supra note 7, at 588.
137. See OPEC ANNUAL REPORT 56 (1976).
138. Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment, adopted June 13, 1976, U.N. Doc. IFAD, art. 6, §§ 3 & 6 (1977) [hereinafter
IFAD Agreement].
139. Id.
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ing system. 4  There are also requirements for a special
quorum (one-half of the total votes in each category) and for
special majorities of two-thirds or more for major decisions,
thereby giving developed nations some leverage against the
combined strength of the OPEC and developing nations.141
A non-economic organization that has a type of weighted
voting system is the U.N. Security Council. The Security
Council has the primary responsibility, under the U.N. Char-
ter, for the maintenance of peace and security.142 It consists of
fifteen members, each of which has one vote. 4 3 Decisions re-
quire nine votes.' 4 4 There are, however, five permanent mem-
bers-China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and the United States-who must concur in decisions on sub-
stantive matters.' 45 This gives each of the permanent mem-
bers a veto over substantive decisions. While many of the na-
tions at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 opposed such a
veto, they agreed to it because without it, the major powers
would not have agreed to form the United Nations. 46
The Security Council has accepted certain matters as pro-
cedural. 47 The permanent members again have a veto, re-
140. Id. art. 6, § 3(a); see Zamora, supra note 7, at 587.
141. IFAD Agreement, supra note 138, art. 6, §§ 2(a) & 5(f); see Zamora, supra
note 7, at 587.
142. See S. BAILEY, VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 3-4 (1969).
143. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27; see U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, BASIC FACTS
ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (1987) [hereinafter BASIC FACTS].
144. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27; see BASIC FACTS, supra note 143, at 7.
145. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27; see BASIC FACTS, supra note 143, at 7. Article 27 of
the U.N. Charter explains:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by
an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the per-
manent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 27. The ten non-permanent members are elected for two-year
terms. The U.N. General Assembly elects them on the bases of their contribution to
the maintenance of international peace and security, and equitable geographical dis-
tribution. Id. art. 23; see J. VINCENT, A HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 157
(1976). In practice, geographic factors have become the most important. Id.
146. See S. BAILEY, supra note 142, at 12-13. See generally Goodrich, The U.N.
Security Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 19-26 U. Barros
ed. 1972).
147. See S. BAILEY, supra note 142, at 16-17. Areas that have been accepted as
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ferred to as a "double-veto," on the question of whether a mat-
ter is procedural or substantive. 48 Thus, a permanent mem-
ber may veto a matter that many might think is procedural by
simply voting against treating it as a procedural matter.
In the first forty years of the United Nations' existence
(1945-1985), there were 184 vetoes, including 114 by the So-
viet Union and forty-two by the United States. 149 While there
have at times been much conflict, more decisions are today
reached by consensus through informal consultation. 50 In
this regard, the decision-making of the Security Council resem-
bles the IMF's and the World Bank's because members always
seek a consensus. The main reason that the Security Council is
effective and even exists is that the voting system reflects the
reality of the members' strength by giving the five nations with
the most military and political strength the right to veto mat-
ters with which they disagree.' 5 ' Without the veto power in
the Security Council, the only U.N. body that has the power to
make obligatory decisions that the member states must carry
out, the United Nations would probably not have come into
being.15 2
procedural include decisions on which the Council has expressly taken a decision that
the matter was procedural and decisions that the Council took despite the negative
vote of a permanent member. Id. at 16. Specific procedural matters include:
[i]nclusion of items in the agenda; [o]rder of items on the agenda;
[i]nvitations to participate in the proceedings; [cihallenges to rulings of the
President; [t]he postponement of consideration of items on the agenda;
[s]uspension or adjournment of a meeting; [o]rder of voting on proposals;
[r]etention or removal of items from the list of matters of which the Council
is seized; [c]onvocation of emergency special sessions of the General Assem-
bly.
Id. at 17.
148. See id. at 14-15. See generally id. at 18-25.
149. See ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS: A CHRONOLOGICAL AND
FACT BOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1941-1985, at 317 (T. Hovet & E. Hovet eds.
1986).
150. See S. BAILEY, supra note 142, at 75-83. See generally Note, Informal Consulta-
tion: A Mechanism in Security Council Decision-Making, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 267
(1985).
151. See S. BAILEY, supra note 142, at 3-4.
152. See id. at 12-13; U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, supra note 143, at 7;
supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing some nations' initial opposition to
veto).
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V. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT
WEIGHTED VOTING
Many international organizations still follow the more
traditional notion of equality of nations in their voting systems.
Unlike the Security Council, both the U.N. General Assembly
and other U.N. bodies, such as the U.N. Conference of Trade
and Development ("UNCTAD"), assume an equality of nations
in their voting systems. 153
UNCTAD was established in 1964 to negotiate and adopt
multilateral legal instruments in the field of international
trade. 5 4 UNCTAD is perceived as an organization that favors
developing countries, which constitute seventy-five percent of
its members.' 5 Each member has one vote and all substantive
decisions require a two-thirds majority of the members present
and voting. 15  As in the IMF and the World Bank, however,
voting is relatively rare in UNCTAD because there exist formal
conciliation procedures to soften the impact of the developing
countries' voting strength, which might cause the developed
countries to refuse to participate. 157 Moreover, before a vote
takes place in UNCTAD, each group-the developing coun-
tries of Groups A and C (the "Group of 77"), developed coun-
tries of Group B, and socialist countries of Group D-must
work out an agreed common position.' 58 It is rare that a devel-
153. See G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 15) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/
5815 (Dec. 30, 1964) (establishing UNCTAD) [hereinafter UNCTAD Charter]; U.N.
DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, supra note 143, at 79-81. UNCTAD is involved with a
variety of programs. One of the major ones, the Integrated Program for Commodi-
ties, aims at securing stable prices for the primary commodities on which developing
countries depend heavily for export earnings through the negotiation of fixed-term
agreements on specific commodities (e.g., rubber, cocoa, olive oil, and tin). See id.
Other multilateral agreements negotiated through UNCTAD include the Convention
on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equita-
ble Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, the U.N.
Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, and the U.N. Conven-
tion on Conditions for Registration of Ships. Id.
154. See Zamora, supra note 7, at 580-81.
155. UNCTAD Charter, supra note 153, 2-4; see Zamora, supra note 7, at 580.
156. Zamora, supra note 7, at 580.
157. See Nye, UNCTAD: Poor Nations' Pressure Group, in THE ANATOMY OF INFLU-
ENCE: DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 334 (R. Cox & H. Jacob-
son eds. 1973); see also Krishnamurti, supra note 47, at 14-18.
158. See K. SAUVANT, THE GROUP OF 77: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION
16-18 (1981); Dell, The Origins of UNCTAD, in UNCTAD & THE SOUTH-NORTH DIA-
LOGUE: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 10, 30-31 (M. Cutajar ed. 1985). See generally lida,
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oping country will vote against the agreed position of the
Group of 77.159 This has, in essence, worked to unify the voice
of the less developed countries within and outside of
UNCTAD.'6 ° UNCTAD's decisions, however, are not binding
on the members and more closely reflect recommendations to
other economic organizations whose decisions are more bind-
ing, such as the IMF and the World Bank. UNCTAD basically
serves the important function of expressing the opinions of the
less developed countries from a more cohesive and stronger
negotiating position.
Another organization that follows the one vote per nation
principle is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the
"GATT").' 6 ' In the GATT, all decisions are made by a simple
majority with the exception of decisions to amend the basic
rules or Articles, which require unanimity or a two-thirds ma-
jority."' Unlike in UNCTAD, however, the developing coun-
tries do not have a major voice in the GATT's decisions. This
is so because the GATT is more of a negotiating body than a
regulatory body, and because nations often negotiate indepen-
dently and guard their independence. 163 Moreover, trade con-
cessions and retaliatory threats weigh much more heavily than
votes, thereby giving the developed countries an advantage. t61
The decisions of organizations with weighted voting sys-
tems are more easily enforceable than decisions of organiza-
tions with equal voting systems because the developed indus-
trial nations with a majority of capital and power are far more
willing to participate. Countries often treat decisions of equal
voting organizations as advisory opinions, but abide by deci-
Third World Solidarity: The Group of 77 in the U.N. General Assembly, 42 INT'L ORG. 375
(1988). The Group of 77 was established in 1964 at the UNCTAD conference in
Geneva, Switzerland. See K. SAUVANT, supra, at 1. During that conference, the "Joint
Declaration of the Seventy-Seven" was adopted, setting forth the outstanding impor-
tance of the unity of developing countries at the conference and in the future. See id.
at 2. The continuation of Group D, the socialist countries, in UNCTAD may be in
jeopardy in light of the rapid changes that have recently occurred in Eastern Europe.
159. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing voting in UNCTAD).
160. See K. SAUVANT, supra note 158, at 131.
161. GATT, supra note 7, art. XXV, §§ 3 & 4, T.I.A.S. No. 1701, at 64, 55
U.N.T.S. at 272.
162. Id.; see Zamora, supra note 7, at 579.
163. See Zamora, supra note 7, at 579.
164. See id.
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sions of weighted voting organizations. 6 5 Thus, while equal
voting systems on their face might be more beneficial towards
developing nations, they do not reflect economic reality and
are thus not as effective as weighted voting systems.
VI. CHANGES AND CHALLENGES TO WEIGHTED VOTING
SYSTEM IN THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK
While the IMF and the World Bank have functioned
smoothly since their inception at Bretton Woods, there have
been recent changes and challenges to their weighted voting
system. First, the balance among the leading members of the
IMF has been changed by Japan's recent move to number two
in the voting order. 6 6 Second, the Soviet Union is seriously
considering and may soon be applying for membership in the
IMF and the World Bank.' 67 Third, many nations, primarily
developing ones, are also requesting a greater proportion of
the total voting power. 168 The rapid changes in the world may
eventually require the IMF and the World Bank to restructure
its weighted voting system, thereby changing the balance that
has allowed the IMF and the World Bank to function smoothly
over the years.
When the IMF and the World Bank were formed at Bret-
ton Woods, the United States had the most economic
strength.169 As a result, the United States emerged with 33.14
percent of the total votes in the IMF and 35.07 percent of the
votes in the World Bank.' 70 As the industrial war-ravaged na-
tions rebuilt their economies after World War II and as more
developing countries joined the World Bank and the IMF, U.S.
voting power declined.
165. See supra notes 35-48 & 80-94 and accompanying text (discussing effective-
ness of different voting systems and importance of voting in IMF).
166. See infra notes 172-86 and accompanying text (discussing Japan's increase
in voting strength); Farnsworth, IMF Panel Votes to Add $60 Billion to Pool for Loans,
N.Y. Times, May 9, 1990, at Al, col. 3 (noting that Germany and Japan will share
number two ranking).
167. See infra notes 189-99 and accompanying text (discussing Soviet Union's
possible entry into IMF).
168. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 43-49.
169. Huntington, The U.S.-Decline or Renewal, FOREIGN AFF. 77, 81 (Winter
1988/89).
170. SeeJ. GOLD, supra note 15, at 238; E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 6, at
802 (listing percentages).
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U.S. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES
Year Organization
IMF World Bank
1946-47 33.14 35.07
1951 29.96 24.99
1961 24.99 29.25
1971 21.42 23.82
1981 20.01 20.84
1990 19.10 17.22171
A. Increase in Japan's Voting Strength
Currently, the United States' ability to dominate and lead
the IMF and the World Bank as it has in the past is clearly
waning.' This is evident from the IMF's criticism of U.S. eco-
nomic policies and by the dispute over raising the quotas in the
IMF and the World Bank, in which the United States was drag-
ging its feet.' 72 The IMF has been critical of the U.S. budget
and trade deficit problems and finds it difficult to tell develop-
ing countries to practice austerity while the United States in-
curs annual budget and trade deficits of over US$100 bil-
lion. 173
Furthermore, while the IMF Managing Director, Michael
Camdessus, had proposed a doubling of the IMF's quotas to
cope with the increasing demands of developing nations and
the demand for assistance in East European markets, and
although seventy percent of the IMF's membership supported
an increase of sixty-seven percent or more, the United States,
along with the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, opposed
171. IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 120; IBRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 43, at 213; see supra note 170 (listing statistics).
172. See Rowen, U.S. Rejects IMF Callfor More Funds, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1989,
at A4, col. 4; Pine, IMF Faces Role Crisis as Leaders Meet, L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1989,
§ 4, at 1, col. 5; Truell, Nations Likely to Discuss IMF Fund Increase, Wall St. J., Sept. 14,
1989, at A17, col. 1; Scherer, Battle Looms on Funding IMF, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Apr. 7, 1989, at A8; Farnsworth, IMF Official Says U.S. Faces Criticism at Talks, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 2, 1989, § 1, at 8, col. 1; Nasar, To the U.S. from the IMF: Shape Up, FOR-
TUNE 77 (May 23, 1988).
173. Budget of the United States Government, H.R. Doc. No. 122, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. A281 (1990); see Steady Trade Deficit Seen, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1990, at D2, col.
6; Farnsworth, Import Fall Narrows Trade Gap, N.Y. Times,June 16, 1990, at 27, col. 6.
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such an increase. 74 The result was a compromise fifty percent
increase. 75 The United States also has stalled with proposals
to increase resources in the World Bank.' 76 There are some
rational arguments for U.S. opposition, such as the United
States' overdue payments totalling more than twice the IMF's
reserves. 1 7 7 It cannot be denied, however, that the United
States is not showing leadership in this situation.
Japan, on the other hand, supported a one hundred per-
cent increase in the IMF's quotas.17 8 In addition, the Japanese
have increased their involvement with third world investment
and lending, becoming the world's largest creditor nation. 179
Japan investors own fifty percent of the World Bank's traded
debt, and Japan recently pledged a total of US$6.55 billion, in
coordination with the IMF and the World Bank, to help reduce
the international debt of third world nations. 8 0 Japan also has
the world's second highest gross domestic product.'' Japan
was properly made number two in the IMF's voting power or-
der, as it had become in the World Bank in 1986.182 The U.S.
argument that Japan did not deserve more voting power be-
cause it did not show enough interest in helping solve the
IMF's arrears problems and assisting less developed coun-
tries 8 3 is no longer applicable in light of Japan's recent large
economic contributions.
174. See Truell, Funding Clouds World Bank, IMF Parleys, Wall St. J., Sept. 29,
1989, at A 1l, col. 1.
175. See id.
176. Id. (United States stalling on $14.5 billion increase in IDA resources);
Sparks, Revolution at the IMF, WORLD PRESS REV., Nov. 1988, at 47 (noting that
United States balked at World Bank's proposal to increase capital base); McNamee,
Jockeying for Power at the IMF, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 1988, at 110 (noting that United States
has not fulfilled pledge to add $14 billion [US$420 million in cash and rest in guaran-
tee] to World Bank).
177. See Rowen, U.S. Rejects IMF Call for More Funds, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1989,
at A4, col. 4.
178. See Francis, Power Sharing is Key Issue, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 20, 1989,
at 1. Japan's lobbying resulted in a fifty percent increase.
179. See, e.g., Rowen, Japan Pledges $2 Billion for Debt Crisis, Wash. Post, June 14,
1989, at F2, col. 4; McNamee,Jockeying for Power at the IMF, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 1988, at
108 (noting that Japanese investors now own fifty percent of World Bank's publicly-
traded debt).
180. Awanohara, Fairer Shares, FAR E. EcON. REV., Sept. 7, 1989, at 89; Rowen,
Japan Pledges $2 Billion for Debt Crisis, Wash. Post, June 14, 1989, at F2, col. 4.
181. Hosomi,Japan Takes Over the IMF, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1988, at 98.
182. See id. at 103-07.
183. See id. at 107.
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Making Japan number two in the voting order, however,
required a compromise with France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom. Under the agreement, Japan will have six percent of
the voting strength, as will Germany; the United Kingdom and
France will each have 5.5 percent, and the United States will
continue to possess approximately twenty percent of the vot-
ing strength. 8 4
While some in the United States fear that Japan may be
trying to take over the leading role in the IMF from the United
States, such fears are unfounded. The United States still has
the largest voting share of any other nation by far. Moreover,
Japan's gross domestic product will never come close to that of
the United States. 8 5 Takeshi Ohta, an official at the World
Bank of Japan, has stated: "We Japanese have never tried to
be the forerunner, only to be second best. We need the abso-
lute leadership of the U.S.' 8 6 It is also clear, however, that
the United States, in its leading position, will have to cooperate
and consult with Japan and other nations more so than it has in
the past.
The United States was thrust into the leadership after
World War II, when it was producing forty to forty-five percent
of the gross world product.' 87 During the 1960s, however,
that percentage declined to twenty to twenty-five percent and
has remained there since.' 88 The United States' voting power
in the IMF and the World Bank has declined accordingly. The
decline of the U.S. share of the world gross product was natu-
ral and the United States would be mistaken to try to cling to
its postwar glory as though it still had half of the global eco-
nomic power. It was once U.S. policy to help the war-ravaged
industrial nations recover so that they could assist in world
production and in the promotion of the capitalist system. Now
that the United States has succeeded and its relative economic
power has declined, it should allow other industrial countries
184. See Farnsworth, IMF Panel Votes to Add $60 Billion to Pool for Loans, N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1990, at AI, col. 3.
185. The United States' gross national product, US$4 trillion, is more than
three times that ofJapan, which equals US$1.3 trillion. See S. HUSTED & M. MELVIN,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1990).
186. See McNamee,Jockeyingfor Power at the IMF, Bus. WE., Oct. 3, 1988, at 110.
187. See Huntington, supra note 169, at 81.
188. See id.
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that have built up their economic strength to carry more of the
economic burden.
B. The Soviet Union's Entry Into The IMF And The World Bank
A challenge posed to the United States, the IMF, and the
World Bank is the entry of the Soviet Union into the IMF and
the World Bank.' 8 9 After refusing an offer to join the IMF and
the World Bank with thirteen percent of the voting shares in
1944, the Soviet Union has expressed strong interest in joining
the IMF and the World Bank over the past few years.' 90 Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev sent a letter on July 14, 1989 to
the annual summit meeting of the Group of Seven industrial
democracies, stating that "[o]urperestroika is inseparable from a
policy aiming at our full participation in the world econ-
omy. ' 9' Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze further stated that "[w]e would like to partici-
pate actively in the work of the IMF and the World Bank, being
convinced that our cooperation with them, as well as with
GATT and FAO [U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization]
will be useful for the community [of nations] as a whole."'192
The Soviets have also sent delegations to study the IMF and
the World Bank and have invited IMF staff officials to an inter-
national monetary conference in Moscow and for a visit to the
state bank.193 The Soviet Union has already been granted ob-
server status in the GAIT and is expected to be granted spe-
cial membership status in the IMF and the World Bank, giving
it access to financial and economic assistance from these orga-
189. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have recently become members of the Fund
and the Bank, joining Hungary, Poland, and Romania. See IMF/World Bank Meeting,
Fin. Times, Sept. 25, 1990, § 1, at 10; Farnsworth, Czechoslovakia Gets $1.8 Billion IMF
Loan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1991, at AI3, col. 1.
190. See Francis, Soviets Eye Economic Institutions, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 24,
1989, at 9. The Soviet Union has already joined the recently formed European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, holding six percent of the bank's capital. See
Greenhouse, A New Bank Plans East European Aid, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1990, at A14,
col. 1.
191. See Francis, Soviets Eye Economic Institutions, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 24,
1989, at 9. The Group of Seven consists of the seven leading industrial nations:
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.
See Chisholm, Cracks in the G7 Front, MACLEAN'S, Mar. 6, 1989, at 30.
192. See Francis, Soviets Eye Economic Institutions, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 24,
1989, at 9.
193. See id.
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nizations 194
The Soviet Union's joining the IMF and the World Bank
would clearly have a great impact. The Soviet Union's gross
national product is greater than US$1 trillion, and would enti-
tle the Soviet Union to approximately six percent of the total
voting power and the right to appoint one of the twenty-two
directors. 95 By its sizeable vote and influence, the Soviet
Union would have considerable clout in both organizations.
Some fear that the Soviet Union might cause problems by
seeking to coalesce a voting bloc within the IMF and the World
Bank, reneging on repayment obligations, or appointing an
ideologically-oriented staff, all of which may tend to polarize
the organizations. 96 Others claim that the Soviet Union's
economy would not be able to adjust its structure to fit the
IMF's requirements. 97 The latter claim is not a very strong
argument in light of the admission of such nations as China
and Romania, which have controlled economies. Some claim,
however, that because of the Soviet Union's economic and
political strength, the IMF should require that the Soviet
Union adhere more closely to the IMF's ideals than do other
smaller and less consequential IMF members.1 9 8
If the changes in the Soviet Union continue at their cur-
rent pace, it will not be long before the Soviet Union will be
able to join the IMF and the World Bank. Should this happen,
it is estimated that the United States would have to give up
194. See Prokesch, Rich Nations Back Junior Soviet Role in Monetary Fund, N.Y.
Times, June 24, 1991, at Al, col. 6; Farnsworth, World Agencies Plan Aid to Soviets and
China, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1990, at D5, col. 1; Bollag, Soviet Union Becomes Observer in
Trade Body, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1990, at D2, col. 5; Farnsworth, World Trade Body is
Expected to Let Soviets Have Role, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1990, at Al, col. 1. Gaining full
membership in the IMF would take the Soviet Union six months or longer. See
Prokesch, supra. At their most recent economic summit, the Group of Seven
presented a plan that included creating a "special association" between the Soviet
Union and the IMF, but they did not approve an increase in financial assistance to the
Soviet Union. Murray & Revzin, Leaders Present Plan To Bring Soviet Union Into Capitalist
World, Wall St. J., July 18, 1991, at A12, col. 1.
195. See Manning, Soviets in IMF-What's in It for the West, Wall St. J., May 8,
1989, at A16, col. 3.
196. See Francis, Soviets Eye Economic Institutions, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 24,
1989, at 9.
197. See id.; Manning, Soviets in IMF-What's in It for the West, Wall St.J., May 8,
1989, at A16, col. 3.
198. See Manning, Soviets in IMF-What's in It for the West, Wall St. J., May 8,
1989, at A16, col. 3.
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more than one percent of its voting strength.' 99
Additionally, should the Soviet Union form a voting coali-
tion in the World Bank or the IMF, the United States would
have to take a more conciliatory approach in the organizations'
co-management. The Soviet Union's entry is very likely to
change the harmonious balance that currently exists in these
organizations, and could very well result in the Soviet Union
becoming a rallying force for the causes of less developed
countries. While the Soviet Union has seemingly been putting
less stress on competing with the Western nations militarily,
and while it realizes that its economy is inferior to that of the
United States, it may still attempt to compete with the United
States by using its strength in the IMF and the World Bank to
assist and thus gain favor with developing countries.
Economic competition, however, should not be feared.
First, it would benefit developing nations. Moreover, the
United States has already invested heavily in many developing
countries and has a great degree of interdependence with
them, placing it in a strong competitive position. Additionally,
the Soviet economy is weak. The Soviet Union is seeking to
attract foreign investment, and must focus on internal woes in
the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the United States would
still have more voting power than any other nation, enough to
veto major decisions, and would continue to work with its
Western industrial allies. In the long run, the Soviet Union
itself may even become an ally of the United States. The So-
viet Union's entry into the IMF and the World Bank should be
encouraged as a way to reform and privatize the Soviet econ-
omy and to guide the Soviet Union to compete in a more
peaceful and constructive manner.
C. Developing Countries' Desire For Greater Voting Strength
The third factor posing a challenge to the current struc-
ture of the weighted voting system of the IMF and the World
Bank is the developing countries' discontent with the current
system and their desire to have greater voting strength. Many
developing countries have complained that their interests are
not adequately expressed within the world bodies that exist to
199. See Francis, Soviets Eye Economic Institutions, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 24,
1989, at 9.
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help them.2"' The developed nations currently control ap-
proximately two-thirds of the voting strength while having less
than one-third of the world population. 20 ' This, many believe,
results in disproportionate representation and decisions which
are not truly in the interests of the developing countries.20 2
Developing nations further claim that the current quota system
limits them from taking as much capital as they need out of the
IMF.203 They believe that the answer is to give them a greater
voting share in the IMF and the World Bank.
What the developing countries do not address, however, is
that it is the realistic apportionment of voting strength that
makes the IMF and the World Bank such viable and effective
organizations. An increase of the voting strength of the devel-
oping countries would not be large enough to make a differ-
ence. Furthermore, a significant increase would ruin the har-
monious and conciliatory balance that now exists, and would
most likely lead to a less effective, polarized organization.20 4
The current structure works because the developed na-
tions have investment or political interests in the economic
well-being of the developing nations. 20 5 Moreover, certain de-
veloped countries, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the
Scandinavian countries tend to argue for the interests of less
developed countries, thereby adding to their strength. 20 6 Ad-
ditionally, the developing countries exercise voting power by
unifying their strength within the IMF and the World Bank
through such groups as UNCTAD, the Group of 77, and the
Group of 24.207 Although these organizations do not put de-
200. See J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 43-49. The developing nations, through
UNCTAD, the Group of 77 and the Group of 24, have sought to change the current
weighted voting system to a voting system that more closely follows the concept of
equality of nations. See generally T. FERGUSON, supra note 21, at 84-108;J. GOLD, supra
note 15, at 43-49.
201. J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 43.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text (discussing functioning of
IMF's voting system).
205. See Zamora, supra note 7, at 603-04.
206. See id.
207. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (discussing UNCTAD and
Group of 77). The Group of 24 was formed in 1972 at a meeting of the Group of 77
in Geneva. See R. SAUVANT, supra note 158, at 60-61 & 127. It is an intergovernmen-
tal group composed of eight nations each from Africa, Asia and Latin America, whose
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veloping countries on equal footing with industrialized coun-
tries, they do help developing countries unify their strength.
The developing countries, nonetheless, have a legitimate
complaint that their opinions are often neglected. There are
ways of addressing such grievances without reapportioning the
weighted voting system.2 °8 One solution would be to do away
with the fixed number of 250 basic votes and allocate basic
votes as a constant percentage of the total vote, as is done in
the Asian Development Bank. 0 9 Such a solution would pre-
vent the erosion of the developing nations' voting power when
the overall level of quotas increase. ° Since new nations are
no longer being created at the rate they have been since World
War 11,211 there will be fewer new members to offset the reduc-
tion of the basic votes to total votes percentage. This would
allow the developing countries to maintain at least the voting
strength they have today. Another solution could be to en-
large the executive boards to allow more representatives of the
less developed countries to be heard, necessitating the hiring
of more qualified staff from less developed countries.21
An increase in the voting power, or adoption of an equal
voting system, is not the answer because it would only weaken
the effectiveness of the IMF and World Bank. The solution lies
in involving developing countries more in the decision-making
process and working harder to resolve their current problems,
most particularly the third world debt crisis.
CONCLUSION
While the world is changing at a rapid pace, the IMF and
the World Bank are in a good position to adjust and help bring
about change. When the IMF and the World Bank were
formed, the framers did not foresee the world that awaited
them. They invited Soviet delegates to Bretton Woods, ex-
purpose is to evaluate the international monetary situation and recommend any ac-
tion it deems necessary for the well-being of the developing countries to the Group
of 77. Id. at 60-69 & 127.
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209. See id. at 607.
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ERS 392-94 (1987).
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pecting them to join. They did not foresee the cost and the
time it would take to rebuild the European nations. They did
not foresee the vast increase in membership. And they did not
foresee the third world debt crisis. Yet, the IMF and the World
Bank adjusted to each of these changes, and remained viable
and effective organizations. In fact, their importance has in-
creased over time.
As the world is changing and we are approaching a new
millennium, it is clear that we could very well be living in a new
and different world characterized by increased economic inter-
dependence and cooperation. Should the drastic changes in
the Soviet Union continue and should the Soviet Union join
the IMF and the World Bank, the IMF and the World Bank
would play pivotal roles in regulating economic competition
among nations to a more beneficial end for all nations in-
volved. They could also play an important role in reducing
tensions between industrialized and developing nations, which
might otherwise worsen as a result of the third world debt cri-
sis and the shifting of the world from an East-West to a North-
South balance of power. Only through organizations in which
a nation's economic strength is truly reflected will all nations
be willing to work toward reaching solutions to problems that
confront them. While advisory organizations with equal voting
systems such as UNCTAD are valuable in expressing the
thoughts and opinions of developing countries, they depend
on the IMF and the World Bank to put such thoughts into ac-
tions or reach compromise solutions. The IMF and the World
Bank have and will continue to provide invaluable assistance to
the ever-changing world and its economic problems. All na-
tions should seek to work through these organizations in the
manner in which they were intended to function-with a
weighted voting system reflecting each members' economic
strength, in which conciliation is stressed and almost always
reached.
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